Recommended Weekend Reads
Latin America Struggles with Cheap Chinese EV Imports, the Very Slow German Military Modernization, and How Russia Creatively Gets Around Western Sanctions.
September 20 - 22, 2024
Latin America
Driving Change: How EVs Are Reshaping China’s Economic Relationship with Latin America Center for Strategic and International Studies
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are navigating a new geopolitical moment. Some LAC countries are benefitting from increased access to low-cost, high-quality electric vehicles (EVs) and new investment throughout the value chain from China that can help meet governments’ climate and economic objectives. However, this comes with risks, as dependencies on Beijing may be exacerbated at a time when China’s economy is underperforming, and geopolitical competition with the United States is on the rise.
Turkey
Closing the backdoor: The new TurkStream is here. Can the West stop it? Politico EU
The EU cannot look away as Gazprom tries to launder Russian gas exports via the new TurkStream pipeline. And fully decoupling from Russian energy now would show Europe still stands with Ukraine. What is TurkStream? It is a new 570-mile gas twin-pipeline running under the Black Sea, linking Russia and Turkey which is expected to deliver 31.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to Turkey. However, According to Turkey’s Energy Minister, the state-owned gas monopoly BOTAŞ would now be able to export around 7 to 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas through Bulgaria to Central Europe under a new brand called “Turkish Blend,” mixing gas from various sources.
Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
In the Black Sea, Turkey has been able to engage in resource exploration and joint security arrangements with its neighbors. Ankara’s approach to the Black Sea demonstrates that with the right diplomatic efforts and mutual recognition of interests, regional cooperation is possible even in complex geopolitical environments. The contrast in Ankara’s positioning in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean highlights the potential for Turkey to participate in cooperative frameworks in the latter case, provided its concerns and interests are adequately addressed.
Europe
Fit for War In Decades: Europe’s and Germany’s Slow Rearmament vis-à-vis Russia Kiel Institute for the World Economy
This study documents Germany’s military procurement in a new Kiel Military Procurement Tracker and finds that Germany did not meaningfully increase procurement in the one-and-a-half years after February 2022 and only accelerated it in late 2023. Given Germany’s massive disarmament in the last decades and the current procurement speed, we find that for some key weapon systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years. When considering arms commitments to Ukraine, some German capacities are even falling. The new Tracker provides detailed information on quantities, value of the orders, predicted delivery dates, as well as the companies from which Germany procures. The situation of slow and insufficient procurement can and needs to be remedied.
The End of the Zeitenwende: Reflections After Two Years of Action Group Zeitenwende German Council on Foreign Relations
“Zeitenwende” is German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s national security and defense transformation, launched in 2023. In a historic speech after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Scholz said the attack marked a “Zeitenwende” (a historic turning point) and Germany must rise to the challenge by undertaking five policies: 1) Support Ukraine in its fight for freedom, 2) Reducing German dependence on Russian energy while continuing to pursue climate goals, 3) Taking a tougher approach to Russia and addressing threats from authoritarian states, 4), Enhancing Germany’s role in strengthening the EU and NATO, and, 5) Ensuring that Germany could militarily defend itself. In this paper, the author argues Zeitenwende has largely failed – an early assessment of what is likely to be a major policy issue as Germany heads toward national elections in 2025.
While the US and China Decouple, the EU and China Deepen Trade Dependencies Peterson Institute for International Economics
Pandemic-era shortages and rising geopolitical tensions have fueled calls in recent years for the United States and the European Union to “decouple,” or at least greatly reduce their dependence on imports, from China. All three of the world's largest trading regions are pursuing policies to diversify the sources of their imports, both as a hedge against natural supply disruptions and to reduce vulnerability to economic coercion. The United States has decreased its dependence on China for all types of imported manufactured goods since 2018, according to recently released 2023 customs data. The European Union and China, however, have maintained or increased their reliance on each other for almost all types of imported goods, creating the potential for future clashes between EU and US national security policies.
Russia’s Evasion of Sanctions
What Wasn’t Sanctioned? Why Russia and the West Continued Trading amid the Russia-Ukraine War American Enterprise Institute
Russia and the West imposed tough economic sanctions on one another during the initial phase of the Russia-Ukraine war, hoping to change the other side’s political calculus. Because the war has lasted longer than either party expected, both have come to tolerate substantial volumes of trade in many commodities, including gas, aluminum, titanium, and uranium, illustrating the constraints on each side’s willingness to incur costs. Both sides overestimated the sanctions’ impact on their adversaries’ decision-making around the war.
The Indian Apartment Behind Russian Efforts to Break US Gas Sanctions Bloomberg
A network stretching from Dubai to China is involved in a multi-billion-dollar effort to ship gas from Russia's Arctic LNG facility. Bloomberg’s analysis of company data, satellite images and ship-tracking information shows the lengths to which Moscow appears to be willing to go to capture market share. In the short term it could provide some wartime profit, but the government’s ultimate goal is to triple LNG exports by 2030 as one of the pillars of any post-conflict economy — especially after losing Europe as its top pipeline gas customer.
Gold Rush: How Russia is Using Gold in Wartime Rand Corporation
This report examines how Russia has been using gold since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It begins with an outline of Russia's pre-war gold policy and describes how it has changed since the start of the war. It provides a discussion of how the gold sector is financed, with attention on the role of Russia's banks and how its gold companies have responded to Western pressure and sanctions. It describes how Russia's gold producers are faring, both in terms of their wartime productivity and access to mining equipment. Additionally, it offers detail on how Russia is seeking to generate revenues from gold and develop its international gold trade. The report concludes with recommending avenues for further investigation.
Geopolitics
Four Geopolitical Disruptions and How to Exploit Them Nadia Schadlow/Hudson Institute
In this provocative policy memo, Schadlow, primary author of the 2017 National Security Strategy, writes that four emerging disruptions will demand the attention of whomever the American people choose as their president: 1) An authoritarian axis is rapidly coalescing around China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, disrupting the belief that an international community has taken shape in the aftermath of the Cold War, 2) Climate alarmism and the prohibitively expensive green transition will give way to energy sobriety, which recognizes the need for abundant, reliable, and cheap power, 3) A new realism about trade will see beliefs about free trade cast aside in favor of addressing imbalanced trade and the mercantilist practices of countries like China, and, 4) The transformational potential of artificial intelligence which will affect individuals, societies, economies, and political systems in ways no one can foresee – indeed, it could be the most disruptive development of all. Schadlow argues All four of these disruptions represent fault lines that have emerged from a shifting post–Cold War architecture. They are not only drivers of the breakdown of this architecture but also symptoms of its failures. Further, they are taking place against the backdrop of America’s relative decline as a world power. The way policymakers shape and respond to these disruptions will impact US power as well as the relative power of other states.